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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

ILO Convention 185 on Seafarers’ Identity
Document thirteen years after entering into
force:
Analyzing
implementation
challenges

Degree:

Master of Science

Seafarers, by nature of their jobs, are forced to stay for months at a time away from
family and friends on board vessels, considered their home and workplace. The
opportunity to go ashore provides a mental and physical break from routine and
contributes to good health and better attitudes towards their job.
However, several life changing events, notably the 9/11 attacks in USA in 2001 came
to change the general attitude towards border security leading to the revision of the
Seafarers’ Identity Convention No 108 of 1958 to the Seafarers’ Identity Document
Convention No 185 in 2003. The introduction of biometrics in this new convention
aimed at facilitating shore leave, transfers and transit at maritime borders while
respecting the security requirements of port States. Thirteen years after entering into
force, not only is membership scant, many Members of the convention are still
struggling fulfilling its requirements.
This dissertation is a study of the challenges in implementation faced by these
Members. It also explores some of the reasons preventing more ratifications.
The data for analysis was obtained by exploiting reports of three key ILO meetings
held on the convention in 2010, 2015 and 2016 in which issues related to the
challenges faced by Governments in implementing the convention were examined.
The information obtained was codified into recurring themes, analyzed and
interpreted. The analysis and results are presented in chapter five.
KEYWORDS: Seafarers’ Identity Document, challenges of implementation, shore leave,
security, biometrics

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION ........................................................................................................ ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ......................................................................................... iii
ABSTRACT.............................................................................................................. iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS ……………………………………………………………………v
LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................viii
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................viii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................... ix
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION......................................................................... 1
1.1

The seafarers’ identity document ..................................................................... 1

1.1.1

Comparing Seafarers’ Identity Documents No 108 and 185................................ 3

1.1.2

The welfare of the seafarer at the center of it all ................................................... 6

1.2

Problem statement and motivation .................................................................. 8

1.3

Objectives ............................................................................................................. 9

1.4

Research Questions............................................................................................ 9

1.5

Methodology ........................................................................................................ 9

1.6

Limitations ............................................................................................................ 9

CHAPTER TWO: MARITIME SECURITY ............................................................ 11
2.1

Early work of the IMO........................................................................................ 11

2.2

The Achille Lauro incident: the first turning point ....................................... 12

2.3

The 9/11 attacks: the second turning point ................................................... 14

2.4

What is maritime security? .............................................................................. 14

v

2.5

Maritime Border Security ................................................................................. 16

2.6

Summary ............................................................................................................. 19

CHAPTER THREE: TECHNOLOGY .................................................................... 20
3.1

Technical requirements of SID C185 before the June 2016 amendments 21

3.1.1

Model for Seafarers’ Identity Document ............................................................... 22

3.1.2

Interoperability tests .................................................................................................. 26

3.1.3

Challenges of the two dimensional finger minutiae barcode.......................... 27

3.2

Technical requirements of the June 2016 amendments ............................. 28

3.2.1

Biometric changes ..................................................................................................... 29

3.2.2

MRTDs formats ........................................................................................................... 30

3.2.3

Impact of the amendments....................................................................................... 30

3.3

Summary ............................................................................................................. 31

CHAPTER FOUR: INFRASTRUCTURE .............................................................. 32
4.1

National electronic database ........................................................................... 32

4.2

Quality control and Evaluations ...................................................................... 33

4.3

ILO Proposals to mitigate technical complexities and cost ....................... 35

4.3.1

International cooperation ......................................................................................... 35

4.3.2

National alternatives .................................................................................................. 37

4.4

Summary ............................................................................................................. 40

CHAPTER FIVE: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS ............................................ 41
5.1

Data analysis ...................................................................................................... 41

5.1.1

Attendance ................................................................................................................... 41

5.1.2

Implementation Challenges ..................................................................................... 44

5.1.3

Obstacles to ratification ............................................................................................ 47

vi

CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................... 50
6.1

Research conclusion and outlook for the convention ................................ 50

6.2

Recommendations ............................................................................................ 51

REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 54
APPENDICES ......................................................................................................... 61
Appendix I: Data Classification .................................................................................. 62
Appendix II: Ratifications of C185.............................................................................. 73
Appendix III: Ratifications of C108 ............................................................................ 75
Appendix IV: Sample of a Seafarers’ Identity Document ....................................... 79

vii

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1

Classification of the implementation challenges faced by Members
of C185

Table 2

Classification of obstacles to ratification by non-Members of C185

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1

Total attendance registered for the three key ILO meetings on
C185

Figure 2

Attendance registered of Members of C185 which attended any
meeting against Members which did not attend any

Figure 3

Attendance registered of Members of C108 which attended any
meeting against Parties which did not attend any

Figure 4

Frequency of registered attendance

Figure 5

Spectrum of PPP contracts.

viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
C108

Seafarer’s Identity Documents Convention, 1958 (No 108)

C185

Seafarer’s Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003 (No
185)

CPO

Central Processing Office

CSCA

Country Signing Certification Authority

DG

Director General

Doc 9303

Document 9303 on Machine Readable Travel Documents of the
ICAO

FAL

Convention on the Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic
1965

FPCC

Focal Point Coordination Centre

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

ILC

International Labour Conference

ILO

International Labour Organization

ILOffice

International Labour Office

IMO

International Maritime Organization

ISPS

International Ship and Port Facility Security code

ISTL

IRIS Smart Technologies Limited

ITF

International Transport Workers’ Federation

MBS

Maritime Border Security

MLC

Maritime Labour Convention 2006

MROTD

Machine Readable Official Travel Document

MRTD

Machine Readable Travel Document

MRZ

Machine Readable Zone

NED

National Electronic Database

PKD

Public Key Directory

ix

PKI

Public Key Infrastructure

QC&E

Quality Control and Evaluation

SID

Seafarers’ Identity Document

SOLAS

International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea

TCS

Tata Consultancy Services

UN

United Nations

UNCLOS

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNCTAD

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

VIZ

Visual Inspection Zone

x

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1.1

The seafarers’ identity document

S

eafaring as part of international shipping is a unique profession. It requires
individuals to spend long periods of time (two to six months on average per
voyage) far away from home, working and interacting with a group of individuals

in a limited environment known as the ship (Utureanu & Dragomir, 2016, p.3) and
exposed to various stress factors and dangers. As the human element in an industry that
transports almost 90% of the world trade by sea, seafarers provide vital skills and services
to maritime transport through navigation, engine operations and fishing in fishing vessels
(Yong, 2017, p.2). However, in spite of their immense contribution, the conditions of work
for this unique set of workers are often below the required standards due to the temporary
nature of their work and the unfavourable bodies of law they may be subjected to (Bauer,
2008, p.643).
The International Labour Organization (ILO), as a specialized tripartite organ of the
United Nations (UN) empowered to promote rights at work and enhance social protection
of workers worldwide, among other things, is very concerned with the wellbeing and
security of the seafarer who has now been under the spotlight since the 9/11 terrorist
attacks in the United States of America (USA) in 2001. Indeed, the terrorist attacks
exposed a panoply of diverse security issues in different sectors which had never been
taught of before or if they had, they had not been acted on.
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In the case of the seafarer, discussions prompted by the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) at its 22nd General Assembly session and Diplomatic Conference on
Maritime Security incited the ILO to revise the 1958 Convention on Seafarers’ Identity
Document Convention No 108 (C108) to include security measures geared towards
facilitating their shore leave or transit through a country related to the operation of ships
(ILO, 2003a, p.1; ILO, 2015, p.2). Hence, the privilege which was granted to the seafarer
with little or no regulations until the 1950s (McConnell, 2016, p.18) has now become a
very complicated affair. This change was a result of growing security concerns as new
flag States emerged with little restrictions to crew nationality combined with political
tensions after World War II (McConnell, 2016, p.19). This complexity for access to shore
leave led to the proposal of creating an international identity document by the
International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF) and the United Kingdom Navigators
and Engineer Officer’s Union in 1954 to the ILO. This document was to help establish the
status of genuine merchant seafarers. The outcome was Convention number 108 on
Seafarers’ Identity Document (SID) which was revised to Convention number 185 in 2003
to include biometric data after the said 9/11 terrorist attacks.
The use of biometrics to enhance border security was spearheaded by the USA when it
passed its Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act in May 2002, eight
months after the 9/11 attacks. The said law contained a variety of sections relating to
immigration control and called for the integration of a machine readable biometric method
of authentication into passports over the period 2003-2006 (Stanton, Chango, & Owens,
2008, p.10). Taking queue from this, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)1
through its Technical Advisory Group on Machine Readable Travel Documents
(TAG/MRTD), carried out major revisions to Document 9303 Part 2 (Third edition, 2005)
to harmonize specifications for machine readable passports, visas and other travel
documents and provided, among others, structural features to enhance the security of
the said documents (ICAO, 2005, p.I-1).

1

The International Civil Aviation Organization is a specialized agency of the UN established by States in 1944 to manage
the administration and governance of the Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention)
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However, the ICAO has had several editions since 2005, the latest being the seventh
edition of 2015 which is being referred to in the amended annexes to the SID C185 and
to subsequent amendments.

1.1.1 Comparing Seafarers’ Identity Documents No 108 and 185
The peculiarity of Seafarers’ Identity Document Convention No 185 (C185) is that unlike
its predecessor, it is not directed to States in their role as Flag States (article 2 of C108)
but is directed substantively towards their role as labour suppliers (McConnell, 2016),
that is, the State of nationality or permanent residence of the seafarer (article 1 of C185).
The Maritime Labour Convention 2006 (MLC 2006) has a similar approach. It is the first
convention in which the specific category of labour-supplying countries is introduced and
it dedicates Regulation 5.3 to specify the responsibilities of labour-suppliers.
Structure-wise, C185 is made up of eighteen articles, that is, four articles longer than
C108, and three annexes which are an integral part of the Convention. Following is a
brief comparison of the two conventions article by article.
Article 1
The definition of a seafarer is the same in both documents but with regards to
interpretation in case of doubt, the competent authority is the one designated by the State
of nationality or permanent residence of the seafarer for SID C185 whereas it was not
specified in SID C108. In addition, SID C185 can be extended to fishing vessels after
consultation with representatives of the fishing sector.
Article 2
Seafarers have the right to be issued with SIDs in conformity with provisions of both C108
and C185 by State parties (Members) to the conventions. In C185, the said identity
documents may be issued under conditions prescribed by national laws and regulations
for the issuance of travel documents and only to citizens or permanent residents of a
country unlike C108 which permitted countries to issue SIDs to nationals from any country
regardless if they are nationals or permanent residents of the said country or not.
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It may arise that a seafarer possesses SIDs issued under C108 and C185. This may
come about where one document was issued by a Flag State under C108 and another
from his/her State of nationality under C185. It becomes a problem when the SID
provided by the Flag State is still valid. Labour-supplying States will have to be vigilant in
this regard.
Articles 3&4 of SID C108 and 3&7 of SID C185
Article 3 in C108 is the same as article 7 in C185 while article 3 in C185 is the same as
article 4 of SID C108. Article 3 of C185 is more detailed than article 4 of C108. It specifies,
among other things:
-

the content and form of the SID with details set out in Annex I, the machine
readability and availability of documents to Governments at low cost with difficulty
to falsify and that the document is a stand-alone document and not a passport;

-

the maximum validity of the identity document being 10 years subject to renewal
after the first 5 years for C185 while it was unspecified in C108;

-

the inclusion of biometric data in C185 as well as the harmonization of content
and form. It is no longer at the discretion of Governments. Seafarers also have
access to machines enabling them to inspect non-eye readable data.

While article 3 of SID C108 simply states that the identity document shall be in the
possession of the seafarer at all times, article 7 of C185 provides that the document could
be placed in the custody of the captain with the seafarer’s consent for safekeeping and
that it could be withdrawn by the issuing State if the conditions for issuance are no longer
met. These conditions are to be drawn up in consultation with representatives of shipowners’ and seafarers’ organizations with a chance for the seafarer to appeal the
decision.
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Article 4 of SID C185 (new)
It sets out how the National Electronic Database (NED) should be operated with details
in Annex II. Moreover, a designated focal-point in each country is required to provide the
necessary authentication to enquiring countries.
Articles 5&6 of SID C108 and article 6 of SID C185
Article 6 of C185 combines articles 5&6 of C108. The major additions are that reasonable
advance notice must be made of the seafarer’s arrival to facilitate shore leave and that
transit and verification of SIDs shall be at no cost to the seafarer. It is clearly stated in
C185 that visas shall not be required for the purpose of shore leave but it is ambiguous
in C108. Non-Members of C185 may require visas.
Article 5 of SID C185 (new)
It provides measures for Quality Control and Evaluation (QC&E) of procedures and
issuance to maintain quality. Regular reporting is also required at least every 5 years to
the Director-General (DG) of ILO with copies to representatives of ship-owners and
seafarers’ organizations.
Article 8 of SID C185 (new)
Article 8, offers the possibilities for amendments of the three annexes and an opportunity
to give written notices in case of reservations and difficulties. The possibility to amend
the annexes only is a novelty. Decisions for amendments require a majority of at least
two-thirds of the votes of delegates present at the International Labour Conference (ILC)
including at least half the Members of C185. Any Member which does not agree to the
amendments has six months to give a written notice to the DG of the ILO after its
adoption.
Article 9 of SID C85 (new)
This addition to the convention provides the option of provisional application of the
Convention by States which have already ratified C108 under two outlined conditions:
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-

that it is taking measures with a view to ratify the convention; and

-

SIDs issued by it under C185 will be accepted if requirements of articles 2 to 5
are met and that it accepts SIDs issued by Members of C185.

Articles 10 – 18 of SID C185
Apart from article 10 which is the last addition stating that C185 revises C108, the rest of
the articles are the same as articles 7-14 of C108. These are final provisions giving
conditions of entry into force of the convention for Members, when to denounce the
convention, notifications of the DG to the Members and communications to the SecretaryGeneral of the UN, how to proceed with the revision in whole or in part of the convention
and the status of the convention and its Members should a new revising convention be
adopted.

1.1.2 The welfare of the seafarer at the center of it all
It is not possible to discuss the seafarer’s identity document convention without mention
of the welfare of the seafarer as they are connected. In fact, it is the concern of the
wellbeing of the seafarer that led to the discussion and subsequent adoption of C108 in
1958 and C185 in 2003.
The unique working environment of the seafarer has a great influence on his/her
psychological wellbeing. He is required to live and work in a confined place, far away
from family and friends for prolonged periods exposed to the same physical environment
and monotony. The number of environmental stressors present are therefore long-lasting
(Doyle et al., 2016, p.199). To break the monotony, shore leave for a seafarer is a
necessity. It permits him to interact with a new environment and people and to get medical
and psychological care when needed. Unfortunately, these needs are not always
considered by port States but also by the changing nature of the industry. Turn-around
time is faster, crews are getting smaller and numerous inspections and paper work,
among other things, leave little time for relaxation and when some do have time to go
ashore, they are unable or discouraged because the ports are far from the nearest cities
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and transportation is costly. Very few countries, if any at all, consider the needs of the
seafarer when deciding on the location of a seaport.
In customary international law, the right for temporal access to shore can be traced as
far back as the sixteenth century in the Laws of Wisby and the Code of Oleron (Lee,
2017, p.970). Nowadays, the ILO is the organization that sets international labour
standards. The campaigners of the 1958 SID convention sought for the adoption, under
ILO auspices, of an internationally recognized seafarer’s passport or similar document in
view of the difficulties faced by seafarers with immigration and security regulations of
different countries (ILO, 2003a, p.2). Though the final document fell short of their
expectations, it still served as a common platform for reciprocal identification by
contracting Governments.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks came to aggravate an already difficult situation. The threat of
terrorism became more palpable and awareness more acute, prompting radical
measures by the USA and with it, dragging many countries along. Border control at
several entry points in many countries will never be the same again. The International
Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) of the IMO was rapidly adopted in 2002 and
added as a new chapter XI-2 in the International Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) of 1974 to address maritime security. To facilitate shore leave, access to shore
facilities and transit in the face of such stringent security measures, it was necessary that
the seafarer could be positively identified and that such identity could be verified, hence
the revision of C108 and the introduction of biometrics to create a new convention, SID
C185.
Before its adoption, two proposals were made: Creating a Protocol to C108 or a new
Convention altogether. Most countries preferred the second option (ILO, 2003b, pp.158162). Further in time, C185 was not included in the MLC 2006 by reason of its recent
amendment and adoption (ILO, 2006a, p.2). Compared to the consolidated conventions
in the MLC, C185 was still very new with only four ratifications at the time the MLC was
adopted in February 2006. The ILO probably needed more time to observe the workability
of the convention.
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Convention 185 was adopted in June 2003 at the 91st session of the ILC with 392 votes
in favour, 20 abstentions and no votes against (Doumbia-Henry, 2003, p.130). So far, this
convention has thirty-five ratifications, one of which is provisional. When compared with
the thirty-nine other ILO conventions on seafarers, C185 is the second most ratified
convention, after the MLC 2006, in the first fifteen years after their adoption. Though not
satisfactory, this attests to the willingness of Governments to take into consideration the
wellbeing of the seafarer while facilitating international commerce and securing their
borders.

1.2

Problem statement and motivation

The advantages of using biometrics for identification is unquestionable. In 2010 alone,
the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement through its biometrics programme
removed more than 392,000 illegal aliens, about 50% of whom were convicted of diverse
crimes (“New Zealand to trial biometrics as US immigration hails success of programme”,
2010, p.1). Also, in May 2012, the Dubai's Expertise Centre Identity and Fraud
Documents Agency said it caught 1,137 forged documents with its passport readers
(Dubai's Golf News, 2012 cited in Gold, 2012).
Member States of the ILO know and recognize the importance of biometrics to enhance
safety and security. One would expect, however, that the advantages offered by this
revised Convention will attract more ratifications. Nonetheless, it is not the case. Fifteen
years after, not only are there few ratifications, many countries are still facing
implementation difficulties. So far, only Russia has been declared fully compliant (ILC,
2016, p.523).
The success of C185 is dependent on the ability of member States to be able to
authenticate the closed circuit chips embedded in the documents, if not, it has little
advantage over the traditional, non-electronic SID. It is therefore imperative to identify
and understand the bottlenecks to a smooth implementation.
My motivation to do this research stems from the fact that the international community
through the ILO and IMO is trying to unify security measures to facilitate the access of
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the seafarer to the shore of whichever country s/he may find him/herself and this can only
be achieved through a unified effort of all the stakeholders.

1.3

Objectives

This research aims to:
a) identify and analyze the challenges behind the implementation challenges faced
by Governments and to provide an outlook from the results;
b) find out what are some of the bottlenecks preventing more ratifications.

1.4

Research Questions

The research will be guided by the following questions:
a) What are the requirements for the implementation of SID C185?
b) Are the requirements feasible? Is there a need for change?
c) What are the factors preventing effective implementation of SID C185?
d) What are the obstacles preventing more ratifications?

1.5

Methodology

The chosen approach was qualitative as the objective of the research was to identify and
understand the bottlenecks to a smooth implementation of the SID C185.
The research questions were answered through secondary data analysis. Reports of ILO
meetings held in connection to C185 were studied, codified into recurring themes,
analyzed and interpreted. Primary and secondary sources of data from relevant books,
reports, instruments, articles, official websites were used to further understand and
substantiate on the challenges faced by Governments and other factors that impacted
the implementation of the convention.

1.6

Limitations

This research has sought to provide a general overview of the factors that prevent
effective implementation of the SID C185 through a secondary data analysis. This is a
limitation because obtaining data directly from the sources may have brought out more
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challenges and possible solutions. Nevertheless, the study provides essential elements
worth considering for both Members and non-Members of the convention.
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CHAPTER TWO: MARITIME SECURITY

B

efore discussing implementation requirements and challenges of C185, it is
important to have a discussion on maritime security. Security in general is top
on the agenda of most nations, if not all, as it is linked to its sovereignty and the

drive to protect its borders. Maritime transport security specifically has evolved over the
years, shaped by several landmark events and developed into a major branch of
international law influenced by a number of sources paramount among which is the IMO.
This chapter will focus on the evolution of maritime security, the influence of major
maritime incidents in shaping international and national law and what all these mean to
the lay seafarer, unfortunately affected, due to the distinct nature of maritime transport.

2.1

Early work of the IMO

The IMO is a specialized agency of the UN that sets global standards for safety, security
and environmental performance of international shipping (IMO, n.d). Created in 1948 at
a UN Diplomatic Conference, the treaty came into force in 1958 and has since
established itself as a treaty making body with fifty-four conventions in its portfolio.
However, SOLAS 1948 and the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea
(COLREGS) 1948 revised pre-existed the IMO. The secretarial duties of these
conventions were handed over to the IMO by resolutions A.2 (1) and A.8 (1) in 1959
(Blanco-Bazan, 2004, p.271).
The IMO is made up of five committees. The:
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-

Maritime Safety Committee (MSC);

-

Maritime Environment Protection Committee (MEPC);

-

Legal Committee (LC);

-

Technical Co-operation Committee (TCC); and

-

Facilitation Committee (FAL).

Seven sub-committees assist the MSC and MEPC. The MSC, along with the Assembly
and the Council, was one of the main organs established by the 1948 Convention on the
IMO and today, it handles all matters relating to the safety of shipping, as well as
addresses maritime security issues and piracy and armed robbery against ships (IMO,
2013). This was not always the case. In the beginning, the IMO, through the MSC
constrained itself to safety of navigation, restricting its antipollution role to the acceptance
of secretarial duties in respect of OILPOL 542 and its amendments (Blanco-Bazan, 2004,
p.271; Basaran, 2016, p.3). That focus was nonetheless going to be shaken with the 1985
Achille Lauro hijacking.

2.2

The Achille Lauro incident: the first turning point

As a general rule, human beings tend to be reactive than proactive. It is easier to react
to the known than prepare for the unknown. The IMO was no different. Being a young
organization still trying to establish itself on the world stage, it had many lessons to learn
along the way. The first major lesson was from the Torrey Canyon oil spill. Being more
on the observational side, the IMO began taking pollution and the protection of the marine
environment very seriously after the 1967 wreck off the coast of Cornwall which spilled
about 35 million gallons of heavy crude oil along the coasts of Cornwall, Brittany and
Normandy (Blanco-Bazan, 2004, p.271). A former IMO Secretary General had something
interesting to say about that incident. Sir Collin Goad, in an interview, observed that the
incident and the increased involvement of the IMO in environmental issues as a result,
was a “godsend” (M'Gonigle & Zacher, 1979, p.42), and rightly so.

2

The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, 1954 was the first international convention
adopted to regulate pollution of the marine environment by oil. It has been superseded by the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 73/78
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Acts such as piracy can be traced as far back as seafaring and the IMO had started doing
something about it in the late 1970s by initiating several studies into unlawful seizures of
ships, barratry and maritime fraud (Mitropolous, 2005, p.151) and in 1981, the IMO
Assembly adopted Resolution 504 (XII) entitled "Barratry, Unlawful Seizure Of Ships And
Their Cargoes And Other Forms Of Maritime Fraud”. The UN on its part adopted, in 1982,
the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) with seven articles
(101 to 107) dedicated to piracy. Everything seemed to be in order until the Achille Lauro
incident of October 7, 1985. This occurrence has been written on extensively and I
therefore do not feel the need to give a detailed account of what happened. Suffice it to
say that the attack was orchestrated by a terrorist group called the Palestine Liberation
Front against Israel for the release of 50 Palestinian prisoners held by them (Attard, 2014,
p.499). This action was unlike any act of piracy which are acts generally carried out for
private ends as defined in UNCLOS article 101, for example theft. The act was geared
toward the release of prisoners of a given nationality different from the one in which they
were held, giving it a political character. This was what surprised the international
community who was not quite sure under which regime to address the crime, sparking a
new debate over the provisions governing piracy.
The IMO went to work. On the 20th of November 1985 (IMO, 1985), the Assembly adopted
resolution a.584(14) on “Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Which Threaten The Safety
Of Ships And The Security Of Their Passengers And Crews” and the following year it
issued MSC/Cir.443 on “Measures To Prevent Unlawful Acts Against Passengers And
Crew Onboard Ships” with the objective of assisting member States in the application of
resolution a.584(14). It did not stop there. In March 1988, the Convention on the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA 88) was
adopted. This convention provided States parties a license to take the appropriate
measures according to their national laws against persons committing unlawful acts
against vessels.
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2.3

The 9/11 attacks: the second turning point

If the international community taught it had seen it all with regards to security issues in
the Achille Lauro incident, it was in for a shock. The USA was victim of a terrorist attack
in a scenario that could easily be confounded to a Hollywood dramatic action movie. Over
three thousand persons were killed (Attard, 2014, p.510). This incidence exposed a lot of
security issues in the USA and provided lessons for other countries. Many countries took
measures to reinforce their land and airport entry borders and preventive measures
extended to maritime transport which had not yet experienced this form of attack.
The IMO once again reacted to face this new threat. Consultations with IMO member
States in the same year of the attack resulted to Assembly resolution A.924(22) on
“Review Measures And Procedures To Prevent Acts Of Terrorism Which Threaten The
Security Of Passengers And Crews And Safety Of Ships” in November 2001 (IMO, 2001).
In it, the Assembly called on the MSC, LC and the FAL to review all IMO instruments to
ascertain if any updating was needed and to adopt new measures if need be. These
committees were also to take into account the work of other international organizations
competent in the development of other transport related standards on safety and security
by land, air and sea. This led to the review of the SUA convention and its Protocol,3 the
introduction of a new chapter in SOLAS 19744 and the revision of C108 which is currently
the focus of this study.
Haven gone through the major incidents in history that have changed the world’s
conception of maritime security, the next question comes to mind.

2.4

What is maritime security?

Maritime security is considered a buzzword (Bueger, 2015) with no clear definition. It
could be said that the definition varies with the context in which it is used. From the

3

The amendments to the SUA Convention and its Protocol were adopted in 2005 as Protocols to the SUA Treaties. These
amendments introduced additional definitions to encompass the new realities of acts of violence and provided further
measures for cooperation among States among other things.
4
The SOLAS Convention of 1974 was rapidly amended in 2002 to include a new Chapter XI-2 on “Special Measures To
Enhance Maritime Security” in which we find the ISPS Code in order to address maritime security related issues in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks
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military perspective for instance, maritime security revolves around protecting the
territorial sovereignty and integrity from any form of threat or from the shipping operator’s
point of view, it involves securing cargo and maritime transport so that goods arrive at
their destinations incident free (Klein, 2009, p.5).
One of the meanings of security, as defined by the Oxford English Dictionaries, is “the
state of being free from danger and threat.” Following this line of thought, “maritime
security” will involve taking the necessary measures to keep the oceans free from danger
and threat. However, the words “danger” and “threat” could mean many things and with
a vast and multifaceted sector like maritime transport, many stakeholder interest are
involved. Some academics prefer to define maritime security in terms of measures. For
instance, Mukherjee & Brownrigg (2013) define maritime security as “those measures
deployed by maritime administrations, ship-owners, ship operators and managers, port
facilities and offshore installation administrations, and other maritime organizations for
protection against unlawful acts such as piracy, armed robbery, terrorism and maritime
violence” (p.250). Klein (2009) puts it generally by referring to maritime security as “the
protection of a State’s land and maritime territory, infrastructure, economy, environment
and society from certain harmful acts occurring at, or from the sea” (p.8).
So, maritime security, unlike maritime safety which is focused on the safety of the ship
and the prevention of accidents, is concerned with criminal acts perpetrated against the
ship and its crew, passengers and/or cargo by human beings and which could extend to
land. The seafarer unfortunately finds him/herself in the cross fire as nations, learning
from the various terrorist attacks are protecting their countries from threats coming from
the sea, for the most part linked to terrorism. This is because, unlike piracy or armed
robbery at sea which are geographically constrained and whose motives are private,
terrorism is politically driven and has no boundaries. Acts of terrorism could be
orchestrated against navigation, fixed platforms in the continental shelf and could even
originate from the sea and move to land as demonstrated by the 2008 Mumbai attacks
(Ronzitti, 2012, p.33).
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A number of reported cases and investigations have revealed the use of commercial and
passenger vessels for the transportation of explosives, weapons, ammunition and
members of terrorist organizations sometimes with the knowledge and participation of the
ship-owner and/or crew. For instance, in 2002, the Captain of M/V Sara, owned by a
company called NOVA (suspected of being an al-Qaeda “front” company), radioed
maritime authorities in Italy informing them of the presence of 15 Pakistani men on-board
the vessel whom the ship-owner forced him to take on-board in Casablanca, Morocco.
Though the 15 men claimed to be crewmen when questioned by USA and Italian naval
officers, investigations linked them to the terrorist group al-Qaeda (Mintz, 2002). In
another occasion in 2003, the break-bulk cargo M/V Dona Julia Inez transported three
Islamic terrorists with complicity of the Captain to the port of Sambo Bonita (Colon),
Panama were they were greeted by a Muslim businessman in the Colon Free Zone
(McNicholas, 2008, p.257; 2012, p.55). Also, the possibility that ships could themselves
be used as weapons for destruction just as the aircrafts in the 9/11 attacks were used is
envisaged by some governments.
Unfortunately, these “bad seeds” contribute in making shore leave difficult for honest
seafarers in certain seaports who simply need a respite from routine.

2.5

Maritime Border Security

Maritime border security (MBS) is one of the means by which a nation exercises its
sovereignty in a bid to protect its population. The intended effect is sometimes pushed to
the extreme to the detriment of life offshore. The USA is a good example of such extreme
actions mainly because it had been badly affected by the 9/11 attacks. There have been
many complaints against the government in this regard. A recent case involving some
crew members of Hanjin ships,5 docked in US waters, who were refused shore leave
made headlines in 2016 (Lee, 2017, p.961). This is because new federal laws instituted
after the 9/11 attacks require seafarers to have visas to qualify for shore access in

5

These vessels belonged to Hanjin Shpping, a South Korean shipping company which filed for bankruptcy protection on
August 31, 2016. For more information https://www.joc.com/special-topics/hanjin-shipping-bankruptcy. Retrieved on
September 12, 2018
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contradiction of international conventions such as the 1965 Convention on the Facilitation
of International Maritime Traffic (FAL 65) of the IMO of which the USA is a Party. A 2017
survey conducted by the Seamen’s Church Institute (SCI) in collaboration with the North
American Maritime Ministry Association (NAMMA) in various ports in the USA revealed
that 9.5% of the 9,886 seafarers surveyed were denied shore leave. 72.9% of the
rejection cases were as a result of the absence of a visa. Notwithstanding, this was a
significant decrease of 8.7% from the 2016 survey (SCI, 2017).
The United States is not the only country requiring visas to have access to shore facilities.
Other countries include Panama, Australia and the Syrian Arab Republic. In Australia,
the 2007 Migration Amendment (Maritime Crew) Bill replaced the Special Purpose Visa
(SPV) with the Maritime Crew Visa (MCV). Unlike the SPV which was granted to foreign
crew on presentation of a valid passport and a document establishing their employment
onboard a commercial vessel on arrival, the MCV requires for applications to be made
before arrival to Australia to allow for security checks. Plus, it is free of charge (Federal
Register of Legislation, n.d).
Other countries, like the United Arab Emirates (UAE) do not require visas to grant shore
leave. According to Ministerial Decree No. 569 of 2016 (article 11) of the UAE, Temporary
Entry Permits are provided which are valid for 24 hours to foreign seafarers to have
access to various shore facilities. The application is made by the vessel’s agent to the
Immigration Office at the port of arrival only after the vessel has arrived in that particular
port (Clyde&Co, 2017).
Parallelly, it has been gathered that certain nationalities face particular discrimination in
the exercise of MBS (SCI, 2017; ITF Seafarers, n.d), further increasing the frustration for
these seafarers. For this reason, section 3G of the FAL 65, which reinforces the ILO SID
provisions for the non-requirement of visas for seafarers, underwent amendments (IMO,
2016) which came into force on 1 January 2018. Standard 3.44 adds that:
“Shore leave shall be allowed in a manner which excludes discrimination such as
on the grounds of nationality, race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, or social
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origin and irrespective of the flag State of the ship on which they are employed,
engaged or work.”
An additional standard 3.44bis provides that public authorities shall communicate any
reasons to the seafarer concerned and the master for refusal and put it in writing if
requested by the seafarer or the master of the vessel.
The MLC, 2006 also reinforces the provisions for shore leave. The objective of Regulation
4.4 is “To ensure that seafarers working on board a ship have access to shore-based
facilities and services to secure their health and well-being”.6 This is however too general
and standard A4.4 does not make any considerable substantiation. Facilitation of shore
leave is specifically addressed in Guideline B4.4.6 where it is specifically stated that
“Every effort should be made by those responsible in port and on-board a ship to facilitate
shore leave for seafarers as soon as possible after a ship’s arrival” (MLC, 2006, p.67,70).
Another problem that may arise is actual access to the welfare facilities as
aforementioned. More seaports are being constructed far from the cities and there is little
collaboration in some cases with ship-owners’, seafarers’ and voluntary organizations to
fill in the gap. Guidelines are however soft law, meaning, Members of the MLC are not
obliged to follow them but are required to give due consideration.
It is the sovereign right of every nation to protect its borders from all forms of threat.
Seafarers unfortunately face discrimination at the maritime border, far less or nonexistent in some countries and extreme in others. This partly has to do with what is at
stake for each country. While not siding with the aggressive reaction of the USA to the
9/11 attacks, only a nation who has experienced such a traumatic event will understand

6

Regulation 4.4 provides that:
1. “Each Member shall ensure that shore-based welfare facilities, where they exist, are easily accessible. The
Member shall also promote the development of welfare facilities, such as those listed in the Code, in
designated ports to provide seafarers on ships that are in its ports with access to adequate welfare facilities
and services.
2. The responsibilities of each Member with respect to shore-based facilities, such as welfare, cultural,
recreational and information facilities and services, are set out in the Code”.
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certain actions, but there are other ways around to achieve the same goal. The C185 is
one of such solutions.
The recent amendments to the FAL 65 are laudable. Countries which are not Members
of C108 or C185 but Members of the FAL 65 are under obligation to respect these
regulations. This is however no guarantee as some Authorities can find their way around
these rules. What needs to change is how seafarers are viewed, from being the threat to
security to being allies in combatting crime. Adopting a defensive approach towards
seafarers breeds negative feelings of resentment, anger and hostility making some prone
to terrorist ideologies thereby opening vulnerable points of entry. Including them, on the
other hand, as an integral part of the defense mechanism through fair treatment will
motivate them to do the right things and even to go the extra mile to avert crime.

2.6

Summary

The law on maritime security is constantly evolving and unfortunately as much as the
maritime sector tries to be proactive, it can only truly learn from errors and incidents of
security breaches. However, enforcing security measures at the border is just as
important as looking after the welfare of the seafarer. As border security measures and
technology advances, so does the mind of the criminal. There will always be threats to
national security but nations need to strike the balance between protecting their borders
and concern for the wellbeing of this unique set of workers who contribute so much to
international trade.
In addition, it has been established that seafaring is one of the riskiest professions one
can find and as the years go by it is becoming less attractive for younger generations
who are opting for stability and more attractive jobs on land. Facilitating shore leave is
definitely one way and an incentive to maintain the supply seafarers.
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CHAPTER THREE: TECHNOLOGY

T

he technological requirement of the C185 is biometrics which is an age old
technic of identification. The first known practical example of the use of
biometrics was a form of finger printing used in China in the 14th century (Uzoka

& Ndzinge, 2009, p.1551). Post 9/11, the science of biometrics as we know now was still
a very much nascent technology (Jefferson, 2010, p.24). Over the years, biometrics has
emerged as the unique function for executing the tasks of accurate identification of
persons by their bodily or behavioural traits (Vandommele, 2010, cited in Amirthalingam
& Radhamani, 2016, p.381).
Biometrics (Bio-Life and metrics-measure) is generally defined as measurable
characteristics of individuals based on their physiological features (e.g face, voice) or
behavioral patterns (e.g signature) that can be used to recognize or verify their identity
(Ailisto, Vildjiounaite, Lindholm, Mäkelä, & Peltola, 2006, p.325; Bennett, 2000, cited in
Uzoka & Ndzinge, 2009, p.1550). Other ways of verification and identification can be
grouped into: (1) what you have (e.g Debit card), and (2) what you know (e.g passwords,
personal identification numbers) (Bolle, Connell, Pankanti, Ratha, & Senior, 2004;
Chauhan, Arora, & Kaul, 2010, p.213).
The adoption of an ILO convention with biometric requirements was a first for the
organization. It was a move that offered a timely solution to an identification and security
problem at maritime borders both for the seafarers and the port State.
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The focus of this chapter is on the technical requirements of the SID which has evolved
over time. Divided into three main parts, the chapter will cover the technical requirements
and challenges of C185 before it was amended, the new requirements of the 2016
amendments and a summary.

3.1

Technical requirements of SID C185 before the June 2016
amendments

Traditional biometric identification systems include face, fingerprint, voice, iris, retina,
keystroke, ear, hand geometry, signature and gait. Some new systems include lip-print,
tongue-print, electrocardiogram (ECG), and dental radiography (Chauhan, Arora & Kaul,
2010, p.213). However, the identification system chosen by the ILO was the minutiaebased fingerprint stored in a bar code.
The materials used, dimensions and placement of data of the said document were to
conform to the ICAO specification as contained in Document 9303 (Doc 9303) Part 3 (2nd
edition, 2002) 7 or to Document 9303 Part 1 (5th edition, 2003) 8. Several standards were
also taken into consideration during the conception of the biometric capabilities of the
SID (ILO, 2006b, p.2). These standards include:
1) ANSI/NIST-ITL 1-2000;9
2) ISO/IEC FCD 19784; 10
3) ISO/IEC CD 19794-2:2005; 11
4) ISO 3166-1:1997; 12
5) ISO/IEC 8859-15:1999; 13

7

These documents were withdrawn after the release of the new editions in 2006 for Part I and in 2008 for Part 3. Members
were however free to use the new versions in lieu of the outdated versions as the portions dealing with the physical layout
had not changed substantively (ILO, 2010, p.4; ILO, 2015d, p.6).
8
Idem
9
American National Standard for Information Systems/National Institute of Standards and Technology - Information
Technology Laboratory 1-2000: Data format for the interchange of fingerprint information - table 5.
10
Information technology - Biometric application programming interface - Part 1: BioAPI specification
11
Biometric data interchange formats - Part 2: Finger minutiae data
12
Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions - Part 1: Country codes
13
21
Information technology - 8-bit single-byte coded graphic character
sets - Part 15: Latin alphabet No. 9

6) ISO/IEC 15438:2001; 14
7) ISO/IEC 9945-1:2003; 15 and
8) ISO/IEC 15415:2004. 16

Model for Seafarers’ Identity Document

3.1.1

Article 3 alongside Annex I cover the model and technical aspects of the document and
can be analyzed under three subheadings, Content, Form and System requirements. The
contents of the SID were to follow the model provided for in Annex I; the form of the
document were to fulfill the requirements of the ICAO documents mentioned above and
the system used to obtain the biometric information needed to satisfy certain conditions.
It is important to note that the ILO while setting these standards is conscious of the
financial burden these requirements might place on Governments but expects
nonetheless that minimum quality standards be not compromised.

3.1.1.1

Form

The new identity document with biometric capabilities is a Machine Readable Travel
Document (MRTD). It is an alternative to the passport and a stand-alone document to
facilitate access to shore and transit of seafarers. The document is to be:
-

no larger than a normal passport;

-

simple and concise to include all important information with no excess space;

-

made of durable material with special consideration for conditions at sea to
withstand years of wear and tear;

-

machine-readable to facilitate its verification; and

-

difficult to falsify (prevent counterfeit and forgery) by using products which are not
easily accessible by the general public and judiciously, to be combined with

14

Information technology - Automatic identification and data capture techniques - Bar code symbology specifications PDF417
15
Information technology - Portable operating system interface (POSIX) - Part 1: Base definitions
16

Information technology - Automatic identification and data capture techniques - Bar code print quality test specification
- Two dimensional symbols
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specialized manufacturing processes and design systems which will require
specialized equipment and expertise.
To reinforce the security features of the document, parties are to include at least one of
the following in the fabrication process:
1) watermarks;
2) ultraviolet security features;
3) special inks;
4) special colour designs;
5) perforated images;
6) holograms;
7) laser engraving;
8) micro-printing; and
9) heat-sealed lamination.
Manufacturing these documents to align with the prescription of the “form” carries the
bulk of the cost as care needs to be taken to ensure their quality and protect their
authenticity.

3.1.1.2

Content

Compared to the “form” requirements, the standards in this section are relatively easy to
comply with as it does not require any specialized technology or expertise. The content
of the SID can be divided into four parts: the information of the seafarer, information on
the issuing authority, unique identification numbers/features and general information.
Information of the seafarer: It was decided during the deliberation of C185 at the 91st
session of the ILC in 2003 that the basic information of the seafarer should be maintained
as found in C108 in continual respect of the privacy of seafarers (ILO, 2003a, p.6). This
information includes:
a) Full name of the seafarer;
b) Sex;
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c) Date and place of birth;
d) Nationality;
e) Any special physical characteristics that may assist identification;
f)

Digital or original picture of the seafarer; and

g) Signature of the seafarer.
Information on the issuing authority: The only similarity of this section with C108 is the
mandatory mention of the name of the issuing authority. Though the other pieces of
information may seem obvious, they were added in the light of the objectives of C185 to
ensure uniformity and to prevent ambiguity. The information required here includes:
a) Name of issuing authority. This would mean a mandatory header with the name
of the State of nationality or residence of the seafarer and designated organization
responsible for issuing the document;
b) Contact of the issuing authority (telephone numbers, e-mail address, website
corresponding to the focal-point each party has to nominate);
c) Official stamp or seal of the issuing authority.
Unique identification numbers and features, absent in C108 include information that
differentiates one document from the other. They comprise:
a) Unique document number;
b) Personal identification number (optional);
c) Biometric template with fingerprint printed as numbers in a bar code.
General information and features are common to all the documents produced and
include:
a) Date of expiry, the validity of which shall not exceed ten years subject to renewal
after the first five years;
b) Place of issue;
c) Type or designation of document;
d) A machine-readable zone;
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e) Two statements: (1) stating the purpose of the document and (2) specifying that
the document is a stand-alone document.

3.1.1.3

System requirements

The biometric data collection process outlined in article 3(8) provides first and foremost
that it be carried out in a way that respects the dignity and privacy of the concerned with
no risk to his/her health or discomfort. It further goes on to provide that:
-

the biometric information collected shall be visible on the document;

-

the equipment used for provision and verification of the biometric is user friendly,
available at low cost to governments and can be conveniently operated in ports
and on-board vessels;

-

the system used for processing the biometric data provides uniform and reliable
results consistently to authenticate the identity of the holder.

The choice of the fingerprint for biometric identification at the time fulfilled the expectation
of the tripartite consultative body. The finger image minutiae and not the finger image
pattern was chosen as the best fit to achieve application requirements for C185 (ILO,
2006b, p.3) because a majority of the nations that responded to the ILO questionnaire in
2002 (ILO, 2003b, p.74) indicated their intention to use fingerprint data to search against
existing government databases which are typically Automated Fingerprint Information
Systems databases designed to facilitate searches using minutiae-template based
systems (ILO, 2006b, p.12). It was a logical choice as it would gain general acceptance.
The choice of a bar code to store the biometric data (two fingerprint templates) in a twodimensional PDF417 on the other hand, was based on cost as it was less expensive than
the embedded chip storage technology (ILO, 2006b, p.2). This therefore meant less
storage space. However, the storage format chosen was based on draft ISO standards
dated October 2003 and there were no known manufacturers who had products that
supported the standards (ILO, 2004, p.2). Modifications to the products had to be made
as a result to meet the standards. The International Labour Office (ILOffice) of the ILO
saw the need to conduct interoperable tests to develop a list of compliant biometric
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products for Members to use when implementing the convention and this was
accomplished through the ILO SID Biometric Testing Campaign (ILO, 2004).

3.1.2

Interoperability tests

In 2004, the ILO Governing Body adopted the technical standard, ILO SID-0002 Finger
Minutiae-Based Biometric Profile for the Seafarers’ Identity Documents, with the objective
of achieving global interoperability of Members’ implemented systems as specified in
C185 (ILO, 2004, p.3). However, as earlier mentioned, the ISO standards used were still
draft standards and the existing products needed to be modified and tested. In addition,
the working environment of the seafarers exposed them to situations which could affect
their skin and fingers. It was therefore necessary not only to produce a list of compliant
products but also to ascertain that the working conditions of the seafarer have no adverse
effects on their skin and fingerprints (ILO, 2004, p.5).
A total of four test campaigns were carried out between 2004 and 2008. The first test
campaign was carried out in two phases. Phase one was conducted in a laboratory with
a non-seafaring population to do a pre-selection of products that would be used in the
second phase to be conducted on genuine seafarers (ILO, 2004. p.6). Seven products
were conformant to the required Biometric Interchange Record and the initial
interoperability tests requirements (ILO, 2004).
The second phase was conducted on 126 seafarers, both male and female of 30 different
nationalities, a wide age range and diverse job descriptions, over the period of September
to October 2004 on board the cruise vessel Crystal Harmony (ILO, 2004, p.6; ILO, 2005,
p.3). Of the seven approved products in the first phase, referred to as Biometric Systems
A to G, only two products, A and F attained ILO objectives of 1% false reject report 17 (or
less) at 1% false accept report

18

and the two products were also the best performing

combination of two products (ILO, 2004, p.35).

17

False Reject Report: Obtained when a genuine test subject attempted to match his/her own biometric interchange
record.
18 False Accept Report: Obtained when an imposter test subject attempted to match his/her data different from his/her
biometric interchange record.
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While the first campaign proved useful in identifying products that could be used by
governments for enrolment and verification of seafarer’s fingerprints, the low success rate
meant interoperability using the ISO standard may not be as easy as envisaged.
Consequentially, it was important to find out why the other products failed the test and if
they could be improved on in order to correct the deficiency. For this reason, a second
test follow-on study with the same group of products was carried out in 2005 using offline
images stored during the first campaign (ILO, 2005, p.2,3). This test involved six of the
original seven products. After identifying possible sources of interoperability limitations
and the vendors providing new versions of their products, there was a slight improvement
in the interoperability test conducted (ILO, 2005, p.4). As a result, a third product, Product
C, was added to the list along with the previous two products (ILO, 2005, p.4). The followon test also led to the revision of ILO SID-0002 after expert consultation (ILO, 2005, p.11).
The third and fourth campaigns were conducted in Ottawa, Canada in 2006 and 2008
respectively. They added a total of nine new products and two replacement products of
previously approved products (ILO, 2006c, pp.1,2; ILO, 2009, p.4) on ILO’s list of
approved products making a total of twelve approved products.

3.1.3

Challenges of the two dimensional finger minutiae bar
code

The ILO had invested in carrying out the various interoperability test campaigns which
were fruitful by providing products that governments could use but was unfortunately still
not attracting more ratifications as wanted.
In 2006 and 2008, the ICAO released new editions of Doc 9303 Part I (5th edition, 2003)
and Part 3 (2nd edition, 2002) respectively. Acting on the concern of ILO on the potential
effects of the changes, ICAO in 2009 affirmed that ILO members could still use the new
editions in lieu of the former as the physical layout in the new and old editions had not
changed in any substantive way (ILO, 2010a, p.4).
The efforts of the ILO were not enough to stop the inevitable changes. In 2010, the ILO
held a consultative meeting to discuss, among other things, the challenges faced by
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governments in implementing the convention and to examine proposals for improving the
technical aspects of the Convention’s implementation through the ISO/IEC standard
24713-3

19

(ILO, 2010a, p.5). Two main difficulties with regards to the fingerprint stored

in a barcode biometric were raised:
-

difficulty in identifying suitable vendors to provide the needed equipment by some
governments;

-

technology was changing from barcode to biometric chip. With the launching of
ICAO e-passports, the number of persons holding passports that would potentially
have biometric chips was greater than the number of SIDs using the barcode.
This was seen as double expenditure (ILO, 2010a, p.12).

With regards to the proposed improvements, there was a general consensus that the
technical details of the barcode had to be updated to ISO standards (ILO, 2010a, p.17)
as the ILO faced the reality that technology was changing and that most of the border
security control standards developed since the last interoperability test in 2008 were no
longer available and several of the listed companies no longer existed as independent
entities (ILO, 2015a, p.3). This prompted a consultative expert meeting in 2015 in which
it was agreed that a chip-enabled SID should be developed and that the biometric should
be changed from a fingerprint in a barcode to a facial image (ILO, 2015b, p.15). This
meeting was in turn followed-up by an Ad Hoc Tripartite Maritime Committee meeting in
2016.

3.2

Technical requirements of the June 2016 amendments

The ILC adopted, at its 105th session in June 2016, proposed amendments to the
Annexes of C185 prepared by the Ad Hoc Tripartite Maritime Committee which met in
2016 (ILO, 2016a, p.3-2/1). The technical model of C185 Annex I had now to conform to
the mandatory requirements for an electronic MRTD contained in Doc 9303 (seventh

19

ISO/IEC 24713-3 on Biometric profiles for interoperability and data interchange – Part 3: Biometrics-based verification
and identification of seafarers was specially developed by the ISO-IEC JTC 1, a joint technical committee of the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) to support
the C185 and published in August 2009 (ILO, 2010, p.5).
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edition, 2015) on MRTD and to any subsequent amendments. These amendments
entered into force on 8 June 2017 but for countries which ratified the convention before
it entered into force, a transition period of five years has been provided for the necessary
adjustments (ILO, 2016a, p.3-2/7).
The content, form and system requirements provided in Article 3 and Annex I remained
substantively the same but for adjustments to replace the fingerprint template in a twodimensional bar code with a facial image stored in a contactless chip. For this convention,
the contactless chip is required to contain only information that is already visible in the
visual-inspection zone (VIZ) and the machine-readable zone (MRZ) of the SID plus, data
required for the operation of the chip and its security features.
The following section will highlight the biometric changes, discuss the different MRTDs
formats and the impact of those changes.

3.2.1

Biometric changes

Based on the new structure of Doc 9303, six of the twelve parts have been directly
referred to in Annex I. The following changes have been made:

3.2.1.1

Form

-

Physical characteristics are to conform to section 2 of Part 3;

-

Printing and typefaces used in the VIZ and the MRZ are to conform to sections 3
and 4 of Part 3;

-

A contactless integrated circuit with storage capacity of at least 32 kilobytes is to
meet the requirements of Part 9;

-

Mandatory Logical Data Structure (LDS) standards to conform to Part 10;

-

Encoding and introducing digital signatures following Parts 11 and 12
respectively;

-

Protection from fraudulent activities, tampering and photograph substitution
according to Part 2.
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The security features of the document are different and each SID is to contain at least
three of them instead of one as required before the amendments. Details of these
features can be found in Appendix A to part 2 of Doc 9303. Some features include:
1) optically variable features in the substrate or laminate of the identity document;
2) tactile features in the substrate of the identity document;
3) laser-perforated features in the substrate;
4) microprinted text in the background; and
5) ink with optically variable properties.

3.2.1.2

Content

The sole addition to the content is the inclusion of a “chip inside” symbol as described in
section 2.3 of Part 9 of Doc 9303. The other details are the same with more precision on
how the information is to be presented except for two areas: “Biometric template with
fingerprint printed as numbers in a bar code” was changed to a “Machine-readable zone”
and the requirement of an optional “Personal Identification Number” was removed.

3.2.2

MRTDs formats

Three options for presenting the SID have been provided for in C185:
-

Size 1 Machine Readable Official Travel Document (MROTD) (TD1) described in
Part 5 of Doc 9303;

-

Size 2 MROTD (TD2) described in Part 6 of Doc 9303; and

-

Size 3 MRTD (TD3) described in Part 4 of Doc 9303.

TD1 and TD2 are card formats with different dimensions and specifications with TD2
being larger in dimension than TD1. TD3 on the other hand, is in the form of a book with
a page dedicated to provide information about the card holder, issuance, and validity of
the document (ICAO, 2015, parts 4, 5, 6).

3.2.3

Impact of the amendments

The amendments to C185 were necessary but not without consequences. Several
countries had started or had already put in place structures for the production of the SIDs.
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With regards to biometric, the technical background paper prepared in 2015 for
discussion at the Meeting of Experts concerning the convention mentions estimates of
approximately $10-30 more in cost to produce identity documents with the facial image
stored in a contactless chip (ILO, 2015a, p.17). This cost, however, can only be achieved
if the infrastructure used for the issuance of the document is the same as that used for epassports (ILO, 2015a, p.19).
The change also means additional cost incurred by some governments to acquire
complete issuance systems. This will be further discussed in the next chapter on
infrastructural requirements.

3.3

Summary

The biometric capabilities of the SID have been drafted with care and consideration for
interoperability of the technology and the potential cost for governments. The choice of
the barcode was based on the available technology supported by Doc 9303 and some
ISO standards at the time while the fingerprint was based on the popularity among
countries. Lack of sufficiently available vendors to provide the necessary equipment and
the evolution of technology contributed to the difficulty in its implementation. The 2016
amendments were to respond to the technology change and to provide a SID which could
be authenticated with the same mechanism as that used for e-passports. Since the June
2016 amendments, the convention has registered a promising four ratifications with the
latest in January 2018. Reports submitted for examination by the Committee of Experts
on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations will provide valuable
information on the implementation of the convention.
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CHAPTER FOUR: INFRASTRUCTURE

T

he last chapter discussed the technical requirements of C185. But for the whole
system to succeed, governments need to put in place certain infrastructures.
These are specified in articles four and five of C185. Article four is linked to Annex

II and article five is linked to Annex III. Just like Annex I, these articles were also amended
in 2016. This chapter will discuss the two main structures that have to be set up for the
production, authentication, verification and maintenance of the system. It will also discuss
the different proposals put forward by the ILO to mitigate cost.

4.1

National electronic database

The NED is covered under article 4 alongside Annex II. The purpose of these provisions
is to ensure accountability and follow-up by Members of the delivery of SIDs. Members
are to keep a record of documents issued, suspended and withdrawn. In continual
respect for the privacy of the seafarer, the database shall contain no more information
than that prescribed in Annex II. The seafarer has the possibility to check and confirm the
data stored.
The responsibility of the permanent focal-point is to respond to queries from competent
authorities of ILO Members to verify the authenticity and validity of SIDs issued by its
designated authority. Immigration or other competent authorities of the member State
could get information through the focal-point or have direct access to the database
depending on the preference of the State. Each Member is responsible to communicate
the details of the focal-point to the ILOffice which shall in turn maintain a list to be
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communicated to all ILO Members. This is also another important way for competent
authorities of each State to ascertain the correct contact information of each focal-point
as in the event of doubt, a border officer may not trust the information provided on the
SID. It will however be the responsibility of each State to distribute such a list as widely
as possible to every border control check point in its country. This will require good
communication, transparency, availability of appropriate logistics and cooperation,
among other things, within SID issuing Administrations and collaborating Administrations
especially the Immigration authorities.
A proposal for a focal-point coordination centre (FPCC) or an ICAO Public Key Directory
(PKD) was put forward in the technical background paper for discussion at the Meeting
of Experts concerning C185 (ILO, 2015a). The FPCC entailed having a central
coordination centre, in collaboration with national focal-points, to respond to inquiries
from border agents, visa officers or other competent authorities concerning SIDs. The
ICAO PKD provided the same services with the difference that it existed already with epassports. Members of the ICAO PKD system just had to use the same ICAO Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI)

20

digital signature for the SID. During the meeting of experts,

preference was given to ICAO PKD (ILO, 2015b, p.13). It should be noted that the ICAO
PKD system is not compulsory for Members of C185 but the ICAO PKI is (ILO, 2016b,
p.14). The addition of a digital signature nevertheless comes at an extra cost estimated
at between $20,000 and $100,000 to obtain hardware and software to support secure
digital signatures for Members of C185 (ILO, 2015a, p.14).

4.2

Quality control and Evaluations

The purpose of article 5 and Annex III is to ensure that the processes for the production,
deliverance and issuance of SIDs is not compromised at any level as well as the
maintenance of the database.

20

The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) enables the creation and subsequent verification of digital signatures on e-MRTD
objects to ensure the signed data is authentic and has not been modified (see ICAO, 2015, part 12 p.1).
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Regular reports on independent evaluations of systems and procedures of the
Administration are to be made by each Member to the DG of the ILOffice at least every
five years who shall in turn make it available to other Members.
An important innovation for this convention is the introduction in paragraph 8 of article 5
of a mechanism to produce a list of Members which have complied with the minimum
requirements mentioned in paragraph 1 of the same article. This mechanism, which can
be compared to the provisions of Section A-I/8 of the Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeeping for Seafarers Convention 95 of the IMO on quality standards, has the
goal to create confidence and acceptance of documents issued by the Members and
hopefully non-Members too.
Annex III is comprised of Part A on Mandatory results and Part B on Recommended
procedures and practices. While Part A is obligatory, Part B is not but, is to be given due
consideration to provide additional guidance to achieve the results required in Part A.
Both Parts center the responsibility on the SID-issuing authority irrespective if some of
the processes are subcontracted. The alternative measures used by Members will be
different for each country.
When compared to Article VI of the MLC 2006 which allows Members to use substantially
equivalent measures if they are not in a position to implement the rights and principles in
the manner set out in mandatory Part A of the code, nothing of that sought is provided
for in C185. Members are not required to indicate alternative measures used to attain
minimum results in implementing an SID issuance system required in Part A. This
supposes that the focus is on the results.
The five areas for which processes and procedures need to be put in place are:
1. the production and delivery of blank SIDs;
2. the custody, handling and accountability for blank and completed SIDs;
3. the processing of applications, the completion of the blank SIDs into personalized
SIDs by the authority and unit responsibility for issuing them and the delivery of
the SIDs;
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4. the operation and maintenance of the database; and
5. the quality control of procedures and periodic evaluations.
The investment involved in developing a complete SID issuance and QC&E system will
depend on the country and whether they choose to produce blank SIDs themselves or
delegate it to an enterprise. The cost of an SID issuance system alone depends mainly
on the number of enrolment sites and the number of seafarers in each country. A
complete system has been estimated to cost anywhere from a few hundred thousand to
a few million dollars, aside from the cost for training personnel and maintaining a
continuously available focal-point and an up-to-date NED (ILO, 2015a, p.23).
Nevertheless, countries which have already invested in producing e-passports according
to Doc 9303 and are participating in the ICAO PKD system could spend considerably less
if they chose to use the same infrastructure for the issuance of e-SIDs.

4.3

ILO Proposals to mitigate technical complexities and cost

The ILO in the several meetings it has held on C185 since its adoption has put forward a
number of proposals to mitigate cost. These proposals will be discussed under two
subheadings: International cooperation and National alternatives.

4.3.1

International cooperation

The ILO acknowledged the need for technical cooperation from the beginning as it
adopted a resolution in this regard at the same time it adopted C185. In it, the ILO
encouraged Members to agree among themselves on measures of cooperation to share
technology, expertise and resources and for countries with advanced technology to assist
Members with less advanced technology (ILO, 2003c, p.108). It also availed itself of its
resources for Members who required assistance. In line with this resolution, the ILO has
put forward the following proposals:

4.3.1.1

A global, shared procurement system

This proposal was put forward in 2010 (ILO, 2010, p.10, 11) and 2015 (ILO, 2015, p.24).
In this system, the ILO is to play a central role in facilitating the global procurement of the
components of an SID issuance system including enrolment stations, printers and central
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issuance software, in conjunction with countries with good expertise in IT systems and
procurement. The hardware and software components agreed on will then be made
available to interested countries at a fixed price provided by the successful bidder(s). If
many countries partake in this procurement system, there would be economies of scale
resulting in less expenditure. An added advantage of this procurement system is that
independent evaluations would be simpler as the hardware and software elements will
be almost identical for participating countries.

4.3.1.2

A regional, shared SID system

Here, groups of countries could work together to build SID issuance systems, focal-point
centers and regional electronic databases for all collaborating countries. Nevertheless,
each country will be responsible for deciding on the eligibility of its seafarers before their
enrolment. The printing of SIDs will be done at the central facility hosting the system
which will also store each country’s NED in separate data silos and available to each
focal-point. The success of this system will reduce cost and facilitate independent
evaluations, which in this case, will only take place at the central site.

4.3.1.3

Donor donates its own SID system

This system relies on the good will of a donor country. The SID system will be developed
in the donor country from which it will make copies of its software available to other
countries for free. The countries benefitting from this donation should find it much easier
in implementing C185. Software independent evaluations will also be made easy in the
countries using the same software.

4.3.1.4

Donor funded independent development of a SID system with
independent intellectual property

This proposal seems like the ultimate solution. It entails a donor country or group of donor
countries to sponsor the development of an SID issuance system, including enrolment,
printing, stock control and a NED from scratch by a third party. The intellectual property
of the software could then be transferred to the ILO which will make it available to
Members of C185. The estimated cost is between one to three million USD. Like the
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previous proposals, independent evaluations will be simpler and quicker. There will be a
sole initial evaluation of the software at the ILO and the results will be used as the basis
for subsequent evaluations in benefiting countries. The net results for the countries is
less cost and better implementation of C185.
Unfortunately, there was no feedback from the report on these four proposals, which were
under Option A-7 of the 2015 technical background paper. These options are however
still available to Members and several options can be used together.

4.3.2

National alternatives

These proposals, presented under Part III of a technical background paper (ILO, 2016c)
focuses on how Members could organize their national SIDs issuance processes.

4.3.2.1

Production of the SID by the SID issuing authority itself

In this option, the issuing authority will be responsible for the entire process from the
receipt of the application to production and deliverance. For countries which intend to
participate in the PKD, they will have to bear the full cost of participation. The advantage
of this option is that the issuing authority has full control and access to the system.

4.3.2.2

Production of the SID by the e-passport issuing authority

The second option will be to delegate the entire issuance process to the national epassport issuing authority for countries issuing e-passports. This is to prevent a country
from spending twice to participate in the PKD. The disadvantage is the loss of control by
the SID issuing authority as it will have to delegate its functions to another authority in
the same country coupled with the lack of training of e-passport issuing personnel in
verifying seafarer information. This could be solved if the two authorities share
responsibilities with regards to their specific domains.

4.3.2.3

Enrolment of the seafarer by the SID issuing authority with
production of the SID being contracted

The last option proposed by the ILO in this regard entails the issuance of SIDs by an SID
issuing authority but subcontract parts of the process to an independent entity outside
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the control of any one ILO Member. This is not intended to compromise the fundamental
duties of each Member to secure the process. The independent entity, which could be
called a Central Processing Office (CPO), has the possibility to offer its services to more
than one national e-SID issuing authority. The CPO will only need to develop issuance
software. This option will not only reduce Member expenses in developing an issuance
system but also the cost in managing the PKI. The downside will be to find a willing entity
to take the role of a CPO.
The position of the ICAO
The ICAO, at the request of the ILO, provided technical advice on the abovementioned
three options. The first option was rejected on the basis that ICAO did not allow more
than one participant per country in the PKD, in the case where the country is also
producing e-passports, mainly for security reasons. The third option was accepted on
condition that the ILO took the role of the CPO in collaboration with the United Nations
Laisser-Passez issuing authority in order to use its Country Signing Certification Authority
(CSCA). The United Nations, however, rejected that suggestion to use its CSCA for that
purpose (ILO, 2016b, p.7). The second option was fully approved by ICAO, encouraging
the division of responsibilities between the e-passport and e-SID issuing authorities.
While the second option was well received, especially by countries which participated
already in the PKD, others expressed their reservations. Bangladesh, for example, was
concerned that collaboration between the passport and SID issuing authorities will cause
more delays (ILO, 2016b, p.9). Unfortunately, there are no “one size fits all” clear cut
solutions. What could be beneficial to one country may have an opposite effect on
another.

4.3.2.4

Public Private Partnerships (PPP)

This option was not considered by the ILO but is supported under Part B of Annex III of
C185. Strict monitoring by the SID issuing authorities is however required. According to
the PPP Knowledge Center, a PPP is "a long-term contract between a private party and
a government entity, for providing a public asset or service, in which the private party
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bears significant risk and management responsibility, and remuneration is linked to
performance"(World bank, n.d). The figure below depicts a spectrum of PPP contracts.

Fig

5:

Spectrum

of

PPP

contracts.

Retrieved

from

https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-

partnership/agreements

Some Governments, such as India (Ministry of External Affairs, 2017) and Nigeria (IRIS
Smart Technologies Limited, n.d) have resorted to PPPs in the issuance of national epassports.
For India, a PPP was signed between Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) in 2006 under
the National e-Governance Plan and the Ministry of External Affairs. Its role was to set
up and manage the Data center and disaster recovery operations. In this line, it handles
passport applications, takes biometrics, does office networking and takes care of the
citizen portal, among other duties (TCS, n.d). The Ministry of External Affairs on the other
hand handles sovereign functions such as verifying, granting, issuing, revocating and
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impounding passports (Ministry of External Affairs, 2013). So far, the PPP is a success
story.
In the case of Nigeria, the private partner, IRIS Smart Technologies Limited (ISTL)
designed, supplied, installed, tested, commissioned and now operates, supports and
maintains the complete e-passport system at its own expense since 2007 when the PPP
was signed. Compensation is obtained from issuing passports. The personnel are
however supplied by the Nigerian Immigration Service who is responsible for registering
applications, personalizing and issuing passports, dealing with daily queries and
managing the passport inventory. The Central Data Center, which can be compared to
the NED for e-SIDs, is hosted in the ISTL facility and includes the PKI. This partnership
is clouded with the concern of the CSCA being in the control of ISTL which jeopardizes
the national security of the country (D’Albore, 2017). As of July 2017, the Government is
seriously considering the local production of the passports (Nigeria Politics Online, n.d).
Until then, the PPP with ISTL is still ongoing.
Each country has its own rules, laws and framework and therefore decides on what works
best for it. The e-SID is relatively new but PPPs are definitely workable as can be seen
in the examples from which inspiration and lessons can be drawn.

4.4

Summary

The infrastructure prescribed by the C185 is very appropriate to achieve its objectives.
But as much as many countries acknowledge that, the investments and technical
complexities cannot be ignored. Technical cooperation has nonetheless been strongly
encouraged by the ILO, from sharing technology to outsourcing certain processes and
even proposing a global procurement system. PPP is another option worth exploring. The
essential is, whatever option a country decides to use, it will have to fulfill its obligations
under articles four and five of C185. Security should in no way be compromised.
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CHAPTER FIVE: PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS

T

he objective of this dissertation is to understand and analyze the challenges
faced by Members of C185 in its implementation. The main sources of
information for this analysis are the ILO reports of three key meetings held on the

convention after its adoption. These meetings have discussed issues related to the
challenges faced by Governments in implementing the convention and on strategies to
increase the number of ratifications. They are:
1. Consultations on the Seafarers’ Identity Document Convention (Revised), 2003,
(No 185) held 23 – 24 September 2010;
2. Tripartite Meeting of Experts on the Implementation of the Seafarers’ Identity
Document Convention (Revised), 2003, (No 185) held 4 – 6 February 2015; and
3. Ad Hoc Tripartite Maritime Committee established for the Seafarers’ Identity
Document Convention (Revised), 2003, (No 185) held 10 -12 February 2016.

5.1

Data analysis

The first step in analyzing the data was to draw up a table which classified the relevant
information as shown in the table presented in Annex I. The data was then further broken
down as follows:

5.1.1

Attendance

Column two of the table presented in Annex I is a list of the countries which attended one
or more of the three meetings. A lot of information can be obtained and deduced from
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this column. Of the 68 countries represented as percentages in figure1, 20 are Members
of C185, 24 are Members of C108 and 24 are non-Members to either conventions. When
compared to the total number of Members of C185 and C108, the total attendance of
Members of C185 against non-attendance (figure 2) is higher than that of Members of
C108 (figure 3). This is an indication of the degree of interest, priority or importance
placed in the convention by ILO member States.

Total attendance registered for the three
meetings

35%

Parties to C185

30%

Parties to C108
Non Parties

35%

Fig.1: Total attendance registered for the three key ILO meetings on C185

Attendance of Members of C185

20
15

Attended
one or more
of the
meetings

Attended no
meeting

Fig.2: Attendance registered of Members of C185 which attended any meeting against Members which did
not attend any
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Attendance of Members of C108

29

24

Attended
one or more
of the
meetings

Attended no
meeting

Fig.3: Attendance registered of Members of C108 which attended any meeting against Parties which did not
attend any

The bulk of attendance was registered in 2010 at 51 countries. This dropped to 25 in
2015 and increased to 37 in 2016. Forty-three countries which attended the 2010 meeting
were non-Members of C185. Since then, ten ratifications have been registered in a space
of 8 years. This is encouraging considering the biometric challenges and financial
engagement in maintaining the SID issuance system. Also, a majority of one-time
attendances was registered in 2010 (twenty-one), followed by 2016 (twelve) and lastly
2015 (three). Figure 4 shows the frequency of attendances from the three meetings.
Interestingly, the majority of the 15 consistent participants are Members of C108
(Canada, Latvia, Liberia, Norway, Panama, Spain and the United Kingdom) followed by
Members of C185 (France, Indonesia, Marshall Islands, Philippines and Russia
Federation) and lastly non-Members of either convention (China, South Africa and the
USA). One would have expected that more Members of C185 would be interested in
improving the convention and finding ways to facilitate its implementation.
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Frequency of attendance
36

Participated
in one
meeting

17

15

Participated
in two
meetings

Participated
in three
meetings

Fig.4: Frequency of registered attendance

So far, only 10 countries have automatically denounced C108 by ratifying C185 which is
relatively low. This is not totally negative as Members of both C108 and C185 have the
obligation to recognize SIDs issued under C185. The downside to this, however, is that
there is no real advantage of SIDs issued under C185 over C108 since both documents
are accepted but Members of C185 have to spend more for the same privilege.

5.1.2

Implementation Challenges

Column eight of the table presented in Annex I represents a list of difficulties faced by
Members of C185. These were presented as far as possible in the exact wordings and
order presented in the reports. The next phase was to categorize synonymous alternative
phrasings directly relevant to the topic represented by different colours and the frequency
with which they were mentioned. This categorization produced four themes (table 1).
Unfortunately, very few participants voiced the difficulties faced by their countries. This is
probably because most of the other participants identified with the issues and did not see
the need for repetition. Nevertheless, from those that did, a hierarchy of difficulties was
established as follows:
1. Restricted access to shore by some port States;
2. Financial and Technical difficulties;
3. Legislative and Administrative issues; and
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4. Few ratifications.

Implementation challenges
No

01

02

03

04

Restricted
access to
shore by
some port
States

Few
ratifications

Theme

Financial and
technical
difficulties

Legislative and
administrative
issues

Frequency

03

04

01

02

Table 1: Classification of the implementation challenges faced by Members of C185

The financial and technical aspects have been dealt with in chapters three and four. The
focus shall be on points 1, 3 and 4.

5.1.2.1

Restricted access to shore by some port States

Restricting access to shore by port States is a challenge for Members of C185. This is
because after overcoming the technical and financial barriers to issue SIDs, it is
frustrating to find out that their efforts are not yielding the required fruit, that is contributing
to facilitate shore access for their seafarers when they call at foreign ports. Bangladesh,
for instance, complained that some of its seafarers were refused shore leave in some
ports because it was not in the list of States that had ratified C108. Other Members that
had similar complaints include Indonesia, Korea and Russia. No specific countries were
pointed out. Generally, typically restrictive countries include the USA and Australia. It has
also been reported that seafarers faced shore leave challenges in the Schengen area of
the European Union (EU) (ISWAN, 2013). Currently, the EU is in the process of revising
Regulation No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009
establishing a Community Code on Visas to respond to present security and migratory
realities. Hopefully, with the proposals of the European and International Social Partners
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in the maritime sector 21 (ECSA, ETF, ICS & ITF, 2018), the final regulation will be more
favourable towards seafarers and boost the commitment of Members of C185.

5.1.2.2

Legislative and Administrative issues

Legislative procedures and Administrative organizations vary from country to country.
Legislative difficulties are mostly linked to the relationship between national law and
public international law (PIL). There are two approaches in this regard: Monism and
Dualism.
A monist State views PIL and national law as a single system of law, whereas the dualist
State views the two as separate and distinct systems existing alongside each other
(Ferreira & Ferreira-Synman, 2014, p.1471). In a pure monist State on one hand, PIL is
directly enforceable and in a pure dualist State on the other hand, PIL has to be translated
into national law. Legislative difficulties will most likely be faced by dualist States where
international law has not been domesticated and is in conflict with national law. This
affects implementation of C185 in such countries as it cannot be enforced. To avoid such
difficulty, some countries adapt their national laws to international law before ratifying the
necessary conventions. Canada for example is a Member of C108 but is issuing SIDs in
compliance with C185 and is envisaging developing regulatory instruments in this regard
(ILO, 2015b, p.4). If or when it ratifies C185, it will not face that challenge as there will be
no conflicts of laws.
Administrative wise, the challenge may stem from inter-ministerial or inter-departmental
collaboration. Bangladesh in the meeting held in 2016 expressed concern on this issue
fearing further delays in implementation of the convention if passport and SID issuing
authorities had to collaborate. As mentioned in chapter four, the issuance of SIDs may
need the intervention of one or more ministries or departments. Whereas this
collaboration may work in some countries, it may be very difficult or absolutely impossible

Looking after seafarers’ welfare, the European and the international Social Partners in the Maritime Sector which
contributed a proposal to the Commission of the European Union in December 2017 are the European Community
Shipowners’ Associations (ECSA), the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF), the International Chamber of
Shipping (ICS) and the International Transport Workers Federation (ITF). The proposal advocated for seafarers to be
grouped as special Professional travelers
21
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in others. Countries in such situations have to work harder to ensure successful
implementation of the convention. Administrative challenges could also be as a result of
bureaucracy slowing down processes.

5.1.2.3

Few ratifications

This challenge may have been mentioned just once but it is not any less important. The
Republic of Korea had indicated in the 2010 meeting that it had not issued any new SIDs
since it ratified C185 in 2007 principally because major port States had not ratified the
convention. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Handbook of Statistics, Asia is by far the largest trading region followed by
Europe, North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa and finally Oceania
(UNCTAD, 2017a, p.72). This will place some Asian countries among the major port
countries in the world. Based on the UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport ranking of
the top 40 container terminals in the world for the year 2016, China tops the list with 13
terminals, followed by the USA with 5 terminals, Spain, Germany and Malaysia follow
with 2 terminals each and the rest with one terminal each (UNCTAD, 2017b, p.65). In
total 13 Asian port States, 6 European port States, 1 North American port State and 1
South American port State were represented in the list. However, this is only indicative
as it is based solely on container terminals.
This is significant because if major port States are not Members of C185, it may be
discouraging to Members of the convention which, at this point, is too late for they now
have obligations which must be fulfilled. China and the USA are Members of neither C108
nor 185 but have participated in all the three ILO meetings under scrutiny. It can only be
hoped that these, and many others, will not only acknowledge the importance of C185
but take further action by ratifying the convention.

5.1.3

Obstacles to ratification

While the focus of this dissertation is on the implementation challenges of C185, it is also
important to look at factors that discourage countries from ratifying the convention. Table
2 below presents the obstacles along with the frequency with which they were mentioned.
The first three factors are the same as the first three challenges mentioned in table 1.
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Factors one, two and three of table 2 have a higher frequency than in table 1 indicating
higher participation of non-Members in expressing their concerns with regards to
ratification.

Obstacles to ratification
No

Theme

Frequency

01

02

03

04

05

Financial
and
technical
difficulties

Restricted
access to
shore by
some port
States

Few
ratifications

Visa
requirements

Requirement
of article 6 a
barrier to
ratification

08

05

02

01

02

Table 2: Classification of obstacles to ratification by non-Members of C185

The factors on Financial and technical difficulties, Restricted access to shore by some
port States and Few ratifications have similar explanations to those provided for under
challenges in implementing C185 but with the difference that they are reasons some
countries will not ratify the convention.
With regards to the factor on Visa requirements by some countries such as the USA,
Australia and Panama, Norway was clear that this was one obstacle for it and called for
dialogue with such countries. Certainly, this stance is shared by many more countries.
Norway, in the meantime, intended issuing SIDs in compliance with C185.
Finally, for the fifth factor, countries such as Panama and the USA were restricted by the
Requirement of article 6, precisely paragraph 6 which stipulates that “seafarers shall not
be required to hold a visa” for shore leave. Panama is considering though, the possibility
of ratifying the convention. The same cannot be said for the USA at this point in time.
In addition to the five factors mentioned, another probable reluctance to ratifying C185 is
section 3G of the FAL 1965 (IMO, 2016, p.24), which reinforces C185 with similar
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provisions. Thus far, the FAL 1965 has been ratified by 120 countries, 43 of which are
Members of C108 and 26 are Members of C185. This makes 51 other countries obligated
to give shore leave to seafarers without visas. These countries may be satisfied with the
FAL 1965 and do not feel pressured to ratify another convention with similar objectives.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1

Research conclusion and outlook for the convention

It has been a long road for C185. Updated from C108, the new instrument was to respond
to growing consciousness of insecurity triggered by major life changing events.
Unfortunately, despite being generally accepted, the convention has not been widely
ratified as expected and Members of the convention are faced with challenges in its
implementation.
The main difference of C185 from C108 is the introduction of biometrics as an advanced
means of identification and the addition of three annexes. In order to successfully
implement C185, two main requirements have to be met:
1. the proper use of the prescribed biometric technology; and
2. putting in place the right infrastructure for identification, verification, production
and securing the production process of SIDs.
The convention underwent its first amendment in 2016 in order to align the biometric
requirement with the seventh edition of Doc 9303, a necessary change to facilitate
implementation of C185.
The requirements of the convention are definitely feasible and the outlook good. Apart
from 2003 and 2009, C185 has been ratified by at least one country each year including
2018. Putting it in perspective, e-passports and e-official travel documents, similar to eSIDs, have been around for a while now since they were first internationally introduced
in 2006 by Doc 9303. Soo far, more than 100 countries are issuing these e-documents,
increasing the probability for these countries to also ratify C185.
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There are, nonetheless, challenges which include financial and technical complexities,
legislative and administrative issues, few ratifications and restrictive access to shore by
some port States. These difficulties can be surmounted with time and real commitment.
As the popular saying goes “Rome was not built in a day”.

6.2

Recommendations

6.2.1 Mitigating financial and technical complexities
Section 4.3 of chapter 4 of this dissertation provides eight possible solutions to resolve
financial and technical bottlenecks to ratification and implementation of C185. From the
eight, I recommend three worth pursuing because they can be more easily attained,
provide more autonomy and better control for securing the SIDs. Developed, developing
and under-developed countries can find a solution among these three.

6.2.1.1

Production of SIDs by e-passport issuing authority in
collaboration with e-SID issuing authority

This option should first be considered by countries already issuing e-passports and/or
participating in the ICAO PKD as it prevents them from spending twice for the same
services. The responsibility between the authorities can be broken down into the following
issuing processes:
a. Receiving applications and taking biometrics of applicants;
b. Verification of identity, citizenship/residence and authenticity of the applicant;
c. Recording of data by receiving authority and passing file to another authority for
authorization;
d. Security checks such as police records, work experience or maritime school
attended could be carried out;
e. Production of SIDs including digital signatures, data writing and protection of SID;
f.

Printed SID checked for errors;

g. Entry of SID data into NED;
h. SID issued to seafarer.
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These responsibilities be can be divided as follows:
-

Processes a-d, g & h: e-SID authority;

-

Processes e & f: e-Passport authority.

Further internal arrangements such as logistics and cost of the SIDs can be worked on
between the authorities.

6.2.1.2

PPP

This option is good for countries that are not yet producing e-passports and are not going
to do so anytime soon. The main advantage is that the SID issuing authority can provide
services it would normally not be able to achieve on its own.
The issuing authority may decide to delegate all or part of the issuing processes to the
private partner but irrespective of the type of PPP entered into, I recommend that the
public entity has control over the CSCA for security reasons.

6.2.1.3

Regional SID system

Countries with few seafarers or non e-passport issuing States can benefit from this type
of cooperation. Ideally, the countries should not be far apart geographically in order to
reduce the cost of transportation. Participating countries will contribute towards the
development and running of an SID system. Together, they will spend less to obtain a
PKI and to participate in the PKD. With regards to the processes outlined in 6.2.1.1, each
country will be responsible for processes a-d, g & h. In addition to this, the host country
will be responsible for processes e & f and the running of a regional electronic database.
A regional focal-point center could be optional. The cost of the SIDs may however vary
for each country if the cost of transporting the documents, for instance, is added.

6.2.2 Promoting confidence
MRTDs and MROTDs are internationally recognized documents which provide
identification to nationals traveling in and out of their countries. This has been facilitated
by security features developed over the years for the documents by the ICAO and made
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mandatory for all countries. The e-SID has been upgraded to these standards and in
order to instill mutual confidence in the documents issued by Members, the ILO has put
in place a mandatory independent evaluation and reporting system from which a list of
compliant Members is published. Before the 2016 amendments, the Russian Federation
was the only country which met the required standards. Members are therefore
encouraged to take those evaluations seriously and make regular reports to the ILO. This
list could have a positive impact in facilitating shore leave for seafarers who are nationals
of compliant Member States.
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Publications.
Mukherjee, P. K., & Brownrigg, M. (2013). Farthing on international shipping (Fourth
Edition ed.). Heidelberg: Springer. Retrieved from http://www.vlebooks.com/
vleweb/product/openreader?id=none&isbn=9783642345982&uid=none

59

New zealand to trial biometrics as US immigration hails success of programme (2010).
doi://doi.org/10.1016/S0969-4765(10)70199-5
Nigeria Politics Online. (2017). Nigerian passport to be produced locally from 2018 –
Immigration boss. Retrieved from http://nigeriapoliticsonline.com/nigerian-passportproduced-locally-2018-immigration-boss/
Ronzitti Natalino. (2012). Maritime security and defence against terrorism. In Uzer F.
Bora, & IOS Press (Eds.), Maritime security and defence against terrorism (pp. 3349). Amsterdam: IOS Press. Retrieved from http://search.ebscohost.com/
login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=sso&db=nlebk&AN=529573&site=ehostlive&authtype=sso&custid=ns056238
Seamen’s church institute. (2017). Seafarer shore leave survey. Retrieved from
http://seamenschurch.org/article/2015-seafarer-shore-leave-survey
Stanton, J., Chango, M., & Owens, J. (2008). ICAO and the biometric RFID passport:
History and analysis Syracuse University, School of Information Studies. Retrieved
from
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228985109_ICAO_and_the_
biometric_RFID_passport_history_and_analysis
Tata Consulting Services. (n.d). Success story: TCS Reimagines Passport Services
Across India. Retrieved from https://www.tcs.com/e-governance-passporttransform-indian-passport-office
UNCTAD.
(2017a).
2017
Handbook
of
Statistics.
Retrieved
from
http://stats.unctad.org/handbook/MaritimeTransport/WorldSeaborneTrade.html
UNCTAD. (2017b). Review of Maritime Transport 2017.
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2017_en.pdf

Retrieved

from

Utureanu, S., & Dragomir, C. (2016). Inter-connected roles of the ship, seafarers and ship
management company. Ovidius University Annals: Economic Sciences Series, (1),
424-428.
Retrieved
from https://doaj.org/article/8bfc527100114a849a7e0f
14496bd885
Uzoka, F. E., & Ndzinge, T. (2009). Empirical analysis of biometric technology adoption
and acceptance in Botswana//doi.org/10.1016/j.jss.2009.04.041. Retrieved
from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S016412120900106X
World Bank. (n.d). Public-Private-Partnership legal resource center. Retrieved from
https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/overview/what-are-publicprivate-partnerships
Yong An Park. (2017). Analysis of on-board job taking and separation of korean merchant
seafarers. International Journal of E-Navigation and Maritime Economy, 7, 63-71.
doi:10.1016/j.enavi.2017.06.007

60

APPENDICES

61

Appendix I: Data Classification
No

Country

Meeting
2010

Meeting
2015

Meeting
2016

Total

01

Angola

Yes

No

No

01

Party to the
convention
C108/C185?
C108/1976

02

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1983

03

Antigua and
Barbuda
Azerbaijan

Yes

No

No

01

04

Bahamas

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1992
C185/2006
C185/2006

05

Bangladesh

Yes

No

Yes

02

C185/2014

06

Belarus

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1994

07

Brazil

No

Yes

Yes

02

C108/1963
C185/2010

62

Difficulties encountered /
Observations

-

Shore leave being
denied to its
seafarers in some
ports based on the
fact that Bangladesh
was not included on
the list of States that
had ratified C108
(2016b, P.9).

-

Government was
willing to promote
collaboration
between the national
visa, customs and
immigration
authorities (2015b,
p.5).

Obstacles to
ratification/Observations

08

Bulgaria

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1977

09

Cambodia

No

No

Yes

01

/

10

Cameroon

Yes

No

Yes

02

C108/1982

11

Canada

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C108/1967

-

Financial implications
of the implementation
of C185 (2010b, p.5).

-

Major port States that
voted in favour of the
adoption of C185
restricted access to
their territories to
seafarers holding
valid SIDs (2010b,
p.3);
Improving its SID
issuance system to
the standards of
C185 even though it
is not a party to the
convention. (2015b,
p.4).

-

12

Yes

No

No

01

/

13

Central
African
Republic
Chile

No

No

Yes

01

/

14

China

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

/

15

Congo,
Republic of
Croatia

Yes

Yes

No

02

C185/2014

No

Yes

No

01

C185/2011

16
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17

Cuba

No

Yes

No

01

C108/1975

18

Denmark

No

Yes

Yes

02

C108/1970

-

19

Egypt

Yes

No

No

01

/

-

-

20

France

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C108/1967
C185/2004

-

-
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Delayed
implementation due
to technical and
financial
considerations
(2010b, p.3; 2015b,
p.7);
Implementation
challenges linked to
the need to adopt
related legislation
(2015b, p.7).

Had new visa
exemption rules for
non-Danish seafarers
who possessed valid
SIDs in accordance
with C108 and C185
in 2014 (2015b, p.6,
14).
Needed financial
support to set up
focal point centres;
Technical support on
hardware, training,
communication and
infrastructure (2010b,
p.6).

21

Greece

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1963

-

-

-

22

Georgia

No

No

Yes

01

C185/2015

23

No

No

Yes

01

/

24

Guinea,
Conakry
India

No

Yes

Yes

02

C108/2005
C185/2015

25

Indonesia

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C185/2008

65

-

Major port States
that voted in favour
of the adoption of
C185 restricted
access to their

Major port States that
voted in favour of the
adoption of C185
restricted access to
their territories to
seafarers holding
valid SIDs (2010b,
p.3);
Financial implications
of technical
development were
significant;
Discriminatory that
seafarers needed a
SID in addition to a
national passport for
travelling while other
persons could do so
only with their
passport(2010b,p.4)

-

26

Iran

Yes

No

Yes

02

C108/1967

27

Iraq

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1986

28

Ireland

No

No

Yes

01

C108/1961

29

Italy

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1963

30

Japan

No

No

Yes

01

/

31

Kazakhstan

Yes

Yes

No

02

C185/2010

32

Kenya

Yes

No

No

01

/

33

Korea,
Republic of

Yes

No

Yes

02

C185/2007

66

-

territories to
seafarers holding
valid SIDs (2010b,
p.3)
Challenges in
implementation due
to sustainability and
reliability of the
source of equipment
for continued
issuance of SIDs
(2015b, p.4)

Major port States
that voted in favour
of the adoption of
C185 restricted
access to their
territories to

-

34

Latvia

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C108/1993

35

Lebanon

Yes

No

No

01

/

36

Liberia

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C108/1981

37

Luxembourg

Yes

No

Yes

02

C108/1991
C185/2011

38

Madagascar

No

Yes

Yes

02

C185/2007

67

seafarers holding
valid SIDs (2010b,
p.3)
Delayed production
of SIDs principally
because major port
States had not
ratified the
convention (2010b,
p.16)
-

-

Their seafarers
denied shore leave
despite issuing SIDs
under C185. Had
asked for technical
assistance from ILO
in this regard with no
favourable reply.
Production was
suspended in light of
ongoing

Not envisaging
ratification essentially
due to cost concerns
(2015b, p.14)

amendments
(2016b, p.9)
39

Malaysia

Yes

No

Yes

02

/

40

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C185/2011

41

Marshall
Islands
Mauritania

No

No

Yes

01

/

42

Mexico

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1961

43

Morocco

No

No

Yes

01

C108/2001

44

Mozambique

Yes

No

Yes

02

/

45

Namibia

Yes

No

No

01

/

-

Major port States that
voted in favour of the
adoption of C185
restricted access to
their territories to
seafarers holding
valid SIDs (2010b,
p.3)

-

Major port States that
voted in favour of the
adoption of C185
restricted access to
their territories to
seafarers holding
valid SIDs but not in
possession of a visa
(2010b, p.3, 4);
Needed technical
assistance to set up

-

68

-

46

Nepal

Yes

No

No

01

/

47

Netherlands

No

No

Yes

01

/

48

Nigeria

Yes

No

Yes

02

C185/2004

49

Norway

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C108/1970

-

-

-
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focal point (2010b,
p.6)
Discriminatory that
seafarers needed a
SIDs in addition to
passports while other
travelers only needed
a passport (2010b,
p.6)

Major port States that
voted in favour of the
adoption of C185
restricted access to
their territories to
seafarers holding
valid SIDs (2010b,
p.3)
Requirement for
visas by some
countries a barrier to
ratification (2015b,
p.14);
Low number of
countries currently
issuing SIDs (2015b,
p.7);

-

50

Panama

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C108/1970

51

Peru

No

Yes

No

01

/

52

Philippines

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C185/2012

53

Poland

No

No

Yes

01

C108/1993

54

Portugal

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1967

55

Russian
Federation

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C108/1969
C185/2010

70

-

-

Had experienced
delay in
implementation due
to administrative
and budgetary
constraints (2015b,
p.7).

-

Major port States
that voted in favour
of the adoption of
C185 restricted
access to their
territories to
seafarers holding
valid SIDs (2010b,
p.3)

-

Objective to issue
SIDs compliant with
C185 without formal
ratification (2015b,
p.14).
Require visas before
entry however,
considering
ratification (2015b,
p.5)

Hindered by technical
and legal issues
before ratification
(2010b, p.5).

56

Saudi Arabia

No

No

Yes

01

/

57

Senegal

Yes

Yes

No

02

/

58

Singapore

Yes

No

No

01

/

59

South Africa

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

/

60

Spain

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

61

Switzerland

Yes

No

Yes

02

C108/1971
C185/2016
/

62

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1962
C185/2017

63

Tanzania,
United Rep
of
Thailand

No

No

Yes

01

/

64

Tunisia

Yes

No

Yes

02

65

United
Kingdom

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

C108/1959
C185/2016
C108/1964

71

-

Not considering
ratification of the
convention as it is a
landlocked State and
the few Swiss
seafarers would not
justify the investment
(2010b, p.12)

-

Obstacle to
ratification lay in the
high cost of
producing SIDs and
their verification and
low benefit
associated with few

66

United
States

Yes

Yes

Yes

03

/

67

Uruguay

Yes

No

No

01

C108/1973

68

Vietnam

Yes

No

No

01

/

-

Key
Financial and Technical difficulties

Few ratifications

Restricted access to shore by major port States

Requirements of Article 6

Legislative and Administrative issues

Visa requirement

72

ratifications (2015a,
p.5)
Concerns over article
6 continue to be a
barrier to ratification
(2010b, p.6)

Appendix II: Ratifications of C185
Ratifications of C185 - Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention (Revised), 2003
(No. 185)
Date of entry into force: 09 Feb 2005
35 Ratifications

Denounced: 0

1.

Number
Country

Date

Status

Albania

11 Oct 2007 In Force

Azerbaijan

17 Jul 2006

Bahamas

14 Dec 2006 In Force

Bangladesh

28 Apr 2014 In Force

Bosnia and Herzegovina

18 Jan 2010 In Force

Brazil

21 Jan 2010 In Force

Congo

14 May 2014 In Force

Croatia

06 Sep 2011 In Force

France

27 Apr 2004 In Force

Georgia

03 Feb 2015 In Force

Hungary

30 Mar 2005 In Force

India

09 Oct 2015 In Force

Indonesia

16 Jul 2008

Jordan

09 Aug 2004 In Force

Kazakhstan

17 May 2010 In Force

Kiribati

06 Jun 2014 In Force

Korea, Republic of

04 Apr 2007 In Force

Note

In Force

In Force

14 Aug 2006 Not in force Provisional
Lithuania On 14 August 2006, the Government notified
that it provisionally applies the Convention, in accordance
Application
with its Article 9.
(Article 9)
20 Sep 2011 In Force

Luxembourg

73

Country

Date

Status

Madagascar

06 Jun 2007 In Force

Maldives

05 Jan 2015 In Force

Marshall Islands

24 Aug 2011 In Force

Moldova, Republic of

28 Aug 2006 In Force

Montenegro

27 Apr 2017 In Force

Myanmar

16 Jan 2018 In Force

Nigeria

19 Aug 2004 In Force

Pakistan

21 Dec 2006 In Force

Philippines

19 Jan 2012 In Force

Russian Federation

26 Feb 2010 In Force

Spain

26 May 2011 In Force

Sri Lanka

02 Dec 2016 In Force

Tanzania, United Republic of

11 Oct 2017 In Force

Tunisia

19 May 2016 In Force

Turkmenistan

12 Feb 2014 In Force

Vanuatu

28 Jul 2006

Yemen

06 Oct 2008 In Force

Note

In Force

Retrieved from https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::
P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312330
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Appendix III: Ratifications of C108
Ratifications of C108 - Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention, 1958 (No. 108)
Date of entry into force: 19 Feb 1961
Denounced: 10

64 Ratifications

Number
Country

Date

Algeria

13 Aug 1991 In Force

Angola

04 Jun 1976 In Force

Antigua and Barbuda

02 Feb 1983 In Force

Azerbaijan

19 May 1992 Not in force Automatic
Denunciation
on 17 Jul
2007 by
convention
C185

Barbados

08 May 1967 In Force

Belarus

28 Feb 1994 In Force

Belize

15 Dec 1983 In Force

Brazil

05 Nov 1963 Not in force Automatic
Denunciation
on 21 Jan
2011 by
convention
C185

Bulgaria

26 Jan 1977 In Force

Cameroon

29 Nov 1982 In Force

Canada

31 May 1967 In Force

Cuba

30 Dec 1975 In Force

Czech Republic

06 Aug 1996 In Force

Denmark

26 Oct 1970 In Force

75

Status

Note

Country

Date

Djibouti

03 Aug 1978 In Force

Dominica

28 Feb 1983 In Force

Estonia

11 Dec 1996 In Force

Fiji

19 Apr 1974 In Force

Finland

26 Oct 1970 In Force

France

08 Jun 1967 Not in force Automatic
Denunciation
on 27 Apr
2005 by
convention
C185

Ghana

19 Feb 1960 In Force

Greece

09 Oct 1963 In Force

Grenada

09 Jul 1979

Guatemala

28 Nov 1960 In Force

Guinea - Bissau

21 Feb 1977 In Force

Guyana

08 Jun 1966 In Force

Honduras

20 Jun 1960 In Force

Iceland

26 Oct 1970 In Force

India

17 Jan 2005 Not in force Automatic
Denunciation
on 08 Oct
2016 by
convention
C185

Iran, Islamic Republic of

13 Mar 1967 In Force

Iraq

23 Sep 1986 In Force

Ireland

17 Jun 1961 In Force

Italy

12 Aug 1963 In Force

Kyrgyzstan

31 Mar 1992 In Force

Latvia

08 Mar 1993 In Force

Liberia

08 Jul 1981

Lithuania

19 Nov 1997 In Force

76

Status

Note

In Force

In Force

Country

Date

Luxembourg

15 Feb 1991 Not in force Automatic
Denunciation
on 19 Sep
2012 by
convention
C185

Malta

04 Jan 1965 In Force

Mauritius

02 Dec 1969 In Force

Mexico

11 Sep 1961 In Force

Moldova, Republic of

23 Mar 2000 Not in force Automatic
Denunciation
on 28 Aug
2007 by
convention
C185

Morocco

15 Oct 2001 In Force

Norway

26 Oct 1970 In Force

Panama

19 Jun 1970 In Force

Poland

15 Mar 1993 In Force

Portugal

03 Aug 1967 In Force

Romania

20 Sep 1976 In Force

Russian Federation

04 Nov 1969 Not in force Automatic
Denunciation
on 26 Feb
2011 by
convention
C185

Saint Lucia

14 May 1980 In Force

Saint Vincent and the Grenadines

21 Oct 1998 In Force

Seychelles

06 Feb 1978 In Force

Slovenia

30 Jan 2003 In Force

Solomon Islands

06 Aug 1985 In Force

77

Status

Note

Country

Date

Spain

05 May 1971 Not in force Automatic
Denunciation
on 25 May
2012 by
convention
C185

Sri Lanka

24 Nov 1995 Not in force Automatic
Denunciation
on 02 Dec
2017 by
convention
C185

Sweden

26 Oct 1970 In Force

Tajikistan

26 Nov 1993 In Force

Tanzania. Tanganyika

26 Nov 1962 In Force

Tunisia

26 Oct 1959 Not in force Automatic
Denunciation
on 19 May
2017 by
convention
C185

Turkey

07 Feb 2005 In Force

Ukraine

17 Jun 1970 In Force

United Kingdom In conformity with Article 1, paragraph
2, of the Convention, fishermen shall not be regarded as
seafarers for the purpose of this Convention.

18 Feb 1964 In Force

Uruguay

28 Jun 1973 In Force

78

Status

Note

Appendix IV: Sample of a Seafarers’ Identity Document

Sample of a card format of the seafarers’ identity document. Credit of the Maritime
Administration
of
the
Republic
of
Korea.
Retrieved
from
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_dialogue/---sector/documents/
publication/wcms_177102.pdf
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